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legislature should be a reconstruction of existing laws. Those that prohibit
offensive conduct should not make behavior illegal merely because it
tends to affront certain people. Legislators should discontinue the picturesque but not too helpful characterization of offensive conduct as
"immoral," "lewd," "lascivious," and "indecent." These words readily
call forth subjective standards of application. The laws protecting minors
from harmful behavior on the part of adults should be confined to the
prohibition of adult sexual violation of very young children. Legislation
restricting obscenity should be clarified to prevent the possibility of
infringement of the right to free speech. The notion that criminals are
created from the readers of such matter should not be so readily accepted.
These laws should have a definite standard directed toward the prohibition
of that material which has only one object and that being the portrayal
of the pornographic. The legislature should state precisely what types of
matter are considered objectionable and should know, in terms of substantial harm, why this is so.
There is much that needs to be done in the area of criminal sex regulation. The stopgap efforts to repress the immorality of man should be
discontinued in favor of a realistic consideration of the over-all sex
question. Legislation will not solve all the multitudinous problems, but
one step in the direction of a mature policy toward what is considered
offensive behavior is a recodification of the laws to accomplish intelligent
regulation of voluntary sex behavior and minor sex offenses.

PUBLIC OR PRIVATE POWER-RESPONSIBILITES OF THE FPC
Current development of the nation's water power is set in a maze of
overlapping and sometimes conflicting jurisdictions.' Congress has delegated much of its authority over waters to various administrative agencies.
The Federal Power Commission exercises dominion over power rights.2
1. For a survey of the development of governmental supervision and the present
jurisdiction of certain governmental agencies over various aspects of water control, see
3 REPORT PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY CommI'N 5-348 (1950).
2. "For the first time, the Act of 1920 [41 STAT. 1063 (1920), 16 U.S.C. §791 et seq.
(1946)] established a national policy in the use and development of water power on public
lands and navigable streams." Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water
Power Legislation, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 9, 19 (1945). Prior to 1920, private parties
interested in developing sites under federal jurisdiction introduced bills into Congress;
Congressional approval was almost an automatic matter. Id. at 11. President Theodore
Roosevelt played an important.part in putting a stop to this type of enactment. He felt
that the then current Congressional practice amounted to giving away the property of the
people. Gatchell, The Role of the FPC in Regional Development, 32 IowA L. REv. 283,

NOTES
The Bureau of Reclamation, an agency under the supervision of the
Secretary of Interior, has been selected to direct the construction of
several irrigation and flood prevention projects.' In addition, the Department of Agriculture has certain interests concerning irrigation.4 The
Corps of Engineers, under control of the Secretary of War, is responsible
for supervising the navigation features of all construction programs on
federal waters. 5
Understandably, the divided jurisdiction now existent is a result of
the myriad uses of water.6 Recent recognition of advantages to be gained
from multipurpose planning, however, has rendered split authority over
federal waters something less than satisfactory.' Although a national
water policy has not been formulated, extensive plans covering all phases
284 (1947). Although the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 resulted in many improvements, the Commission created by the Act did not prove satisfactory. It was composed of the Secretaries of War, Interior, and Agriculture; one member of the Senate
estimated that the average time served by the Commissioners amounted to about 5 hours
per year. 72 CoNG. REc. 8752 (1930). An independent Commission, composed of five
members, was created in the 1930 Reorganization Act, 46 STAT. 797 (1930), 16 U.S.C.
§§792, 793, 797 (1946). Five years later, the Federal Power Act was approved. The
former Water Power Act became Part I of the new law; only minor changes were made
in this portion of the statute. 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §792 et seq. (1946).
The general function of the Federal Power Commission is probably best summarized
in the following statement: "Part I of the Federal Power Act effectuates the policy of
Congress providing for the development and improvement of navigation and the development, transmission, and utilization of power on streams subject to Federal jurisdiction, upon lands of the United States, and at Government dams, by private and public
agencies acting under licenses issued by the Commission." U.S. GovT ORGANIZATION
MANUAL 367, 368 (1953-54).
3. The Department of Interior is generally concerned with the management, conservation, and development of the natural resources of the United States. The Bureau
of Reclamation has been assigned the duty of effecting the reclamation of the arid lands
of the West through irrigation and the management of hydroelectric power systems.
Id. at 204.
4. Id. at 238.
5. Id. at 131. Projects linked with navigation, flood control, or national defense
are generally constructed by Army Engineers. Power-irrigation projects, on the other
hand, are usually constructed and operated by the Bureau of Reclamation. Occasionally,
however, these agencies have handled construction which would appear to be the function
of another body. ELECTIC POWER AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 488 (Twentieth Century
Fund 1948). For a list of the various projects constructed by different government
agencies, see id. at 489, 490.
In addition to the agencies previously discussed, the Department of Commerce has
an interest in navigation as a part of its duties concerning the transportation facilities of
the United States. U.S. Gov'T ORGANIZATION MANUAL 272 (1953-54).
6. Water is used for innumerable domestic, industrial, irrigational, power, transportation and recreational purposes quite apart from its role as a source of food and
raw materials. KENDALL, GLENDINNING, AND MAcFADDEN, INTRODUCTION TO GEOGRAPHY
278-313 (1951).
7. For a discussion of the various connected uses of water and the present policy of
Congress toward complete utilization of water resources, see 3 REPORT PRESIDENT'S
WATER RESOURCES POLICY COmm'N 290-293 (1950).
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of water development have been proposed for many regions.' Congress
has authorized surveys for many of the large river basins, designating
one of the governmental agencies to conduct the investigation.' Out of
these investigations a comprehensive program evolves.'" In many instances, Congress considers these proposals and approves them; sometimes, provision is made for immediate federal construction of certain
phases of the plan" although this is usual only for irrigation, flood control, and navigation purposes. 2 Nevertheless, it is now the policy to
consider the power possibilities of these projects.' 8 A dam which is built
for another purpose may often be employed simultaneously for the production of power. Hydroelectric power sales may be used, in this manner,
to defray a portion of the cost of the total development. 4
8. The following statement from the House Committee on Flood Control aptly
describes the use of comprehensive plans:
"The enactment of the bill (H.R. 4485) will continue the national flood-control
policy and program initiated by the act of 1936 and extended by subsequent acts of Congress, including the acts of 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1941.
"Since the Flood Control Act of 1941, a number of reports on surveys authorized by
Congress have been completed and reviewed by the Board of Engineers for Rivers and
Harbors, and reports on flood-control projects with favorable recommendations have
been transmitted to Congress. The plans are comprehensive in scope and contemplate
the most practicable and economical method of providing flood control and, where practicable, of conserving the flood waters for beneficial uses. . . . The plans include
multiple-use reservoirs which will permit the development of economical hydroelectric
power in addition to providing storage for flood control, irrigation, water supply, pollution control, and other purposes." H.R. REP. No. 1309, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1944).
9. Integrated agricultural plans are being prepared for the Pacific Northwest and
various other regions by the Department of Agriculture. 3 REPORT PRESIDENT'S WATER
RESOURCES POLICY COMM'N 436-438 (1950). The Department of Interior has a number
of field committees formulating integrated departmental programs for their respective
regions. Id. at 438-439. The Corps of Engineers and the Federal Power Commission
also have important functions in the development of comprehensive plans. See 32 FPC
ANN. REP. 71 (1952).

10. The functions of many governmental agencies in developing comprehensive
plans once again demonstrate the necessity of greater coordination. For an early discussion of the problems of integration, see Report of Secretary of War Stimson, H.R.
Doc. No. 929, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 32-35 (1912). Some progress in this direction has been
accomplished by a Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Agreement. 3 REPORT PRESMENT'S
WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMM['N 431 (1950).
11. "The bill provides additional authorizations for the prosecution of approved

comprehensive plans and it authorizes a number of individual projects which have been
found economically feasible and desirable. It continues the procedure of authorizing
additional surveys and examinations for flood control and finally authorizes the sum of
$810,000,000, to be appropriated for carrying out its purposes." H.R. REP. No. 1309, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1944).
12.

For a brief discussion of the reluctance of Congress to enter upon purely power

projects, see United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 170 (1953).
13. The Flood Control Act of 1944 definitely asserts the policy of developing multipurpose federal projects. See note 8 supra; TROXEL, EcoNoasics OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
687-710 (1947).
14. Power projects which are a component part of a construction for flood control,
irrigational, or navigational purposes are undoubtedly desirable, both for the power
benefits to the area and the financial assistance which the entire basin development gains.

NOTES
In many river basins, there are sites solely advantageous for the
production of power on a large scale. Their particular attraction may
be enhanced by the flow of water resulting from other federal projects or
may be emphasized by conditions naturally conducive to power development; 1" the federal government has seldom undertaken projects of this
type. 6 The financial benefits to be gained in developing these sites are
evident, and private enterprises have indicated their interest and applied
for licenses in many of these areas.'" Public power proponents' have
maintained that these locations should be reserved for and eventually
developed by the United States.'" Present law imposes the responsibility
for rendering this decision on the Federal Power Commission.
In evaluating an application for a license, the FPC customarily requires that certain qualifications be met.' 9 The engineering feasibility of
the proposed plan must be shown. Costs of construction and maifitenance
and estimates of the demand for power in the area must indicate that the
enterprise will both provide sufficient income and allow a reasonable
charge to potential consumers.2" The applicant must also be financially
This is particularly the case as private enterprise generally would not be interested in
undertaking the original construction.
15. "Licenses will ordinarily be sought for sites or projects benefited or in many
instances made possible by Federal conservation storage reregulating reservoirs constructed at public expense as parts of the flood control program." 1 REPORT PRESIDENT'S
WATER RESOURCES PoLICY Comm'N 237 (1950).
16. See note 12 supra.
17. Applications for licenses to construct hydroelectric plants at the North Fork of
the Kings River, Roanoke Rapids of the Roanoke River, International Rapids of the
St. Lawrence River and three dams on the Snake River are illustrative of the interest
shown in developing such .power sites. These applications will be discussed later.
18. "Issuance of such licenses [such as on the Roanoke and Kings Rivers] to private power interests would have far-reaching effects upon Federal water resources programs, and more especially upon power policy, an important factor in such programs.
Power values created by Federal investment in multi-purpose programs would be utilized
for private profit, instead of bringing about reductions in electric rates and expanded
use of electricity." 1 REPORT PRESIDENTS WATER RESOURCEs POLICY CoMm'N 238 (1950).
19. Some of the general requirements of a procedural nature, which must be followed by an applicant for license, will be found in 18 CODE FED. REGs. §4.30-75 (1938).
These provisions are concerned mostly with the presentation of exhibits which will indicate costs, thus helping to establish the economic feasibility of the project. A form for
applicants is provided in 18 CODE FED. REGs. §200.2 (1938).
20. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 2 F.P.C. 300, 307 (1940). "In order to be 'best
adapted to a comprehensive plan' for the 'improvement and utilization of waterpower
development,' as that language is used in Section 10 of the Act [Federal Power Act], a
proposed hydroelectric plant of course must be economically feasible. To be economically
feasible, such project must be capable of fulfilling the anticipated load requirements at
an annual cost equal to, or less than, that which would be paid for the equivalent power
obtainable from an alternative source." Virginia Electric & Power Co., 10 F.P.C. 1, 9
(1951).
"The use of water for the development of electric energy must be justified economically by the sale or use of the energy so developed, and in examining this economic justification, we have given the question of market extensive study before reaching a decision
upon the pending application." Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 2 F.P.C. 300, 307 (1940).
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able to complete the project, " and it must be shown that the debt incurred
can be retired within a reasonable period.
Recognizing at least partially the importance of completely developed
water resources, the Federal Power Act makes it essential for an applicant's project to fit into a comprehensive plan for utilizing the waterway."2
The precise definition of "comprehensive plan," as used in the Act, is
rather difficult to grasp. 3 If Congress has expressly approved a program
for the area, it is generally conceded that this is to be followed."4 When,
in the absence of Congressional approval, an agency has formulated a
scheme based on surveys of the river's resources, intergovernmental cooperation would be served by FPC adoption of its proposal. The Commission has usually been willing to cooperate in this manner.25 If no
other plans have been formulated, the Commission may investigate the
area or require the applicant to provide satisfactory evidence that his
project conforms to the general development of the river basin.26
21. The applicant must demonstrate that he has financial ability to commence work
immediately on the facilities planned and will be able to complete them. Fresno Irrigation District, 8 F.P.C. 348, 357 (1949).
22. Section 10(a) of the Federal Power Act, 41 STAT. 1068 (1920), as amended,
49 STAT. 842 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §803(a) (1946), requires "that the project adopted, including the maps, plans, and specifications, shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a
waterway or waterways ...

"

See also Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 2 F.P.C. 300,

307 (1940).
23. Since comprehensive plans are formulated by various governmental agencies, see
note 9 supra, it becomes apparent that the term "comprehensive plan" may mean a number
of things. The most logical assumption from the words of the Act would be that the
Commission would formulate plans of its own. In some situations this is done. See, e.g.,
30 FPC ANN. REP. 56 (1950); 27 FPC ANN. REP. 59 (1947).
24. 3 REPORT PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY Comi'.- 295-299 (1950).
25. Where a plan has been developed by another agency it would be a waste of time
and money for the Commission to insist on making a totally independent scheme. See
Power Authority of the State of New York, 9 F.P.C. 301 (1950) (adopting plan of
Army Engineers). It has also been pointed out, see note 10 supra, that the agencies cooperate in carrying out their respective functions. For a list of all of the various agencies
engaged in collecting data and the methods of cooperation, see 1 REPORT PRESIDENT'S
WATER RESOURCES POLICY Co1M,'N

100-102 (1950).

26. See note 23 supra. One important requisite for a license, although not directly
pertinent to the analysis intended in the text, is the stipulation in Section 9(b) of the
Federal Power Act that the applicant must show satisfactory evidence of compliance with
the requirements of state law. 41 STAT. 1068 (1920), 16 U.S.C. §802(b) (1946). This
requirement has raised some challenging questions in connection with several recent
cases. City of Tacoma, Washington, 10 F.P.C. 424 (1951), and Portland General Electric
Co., 10 F.P.C. 445 (1951), concerned the awarding of licenses to municipalities for power
projects in the face of objections posed by state governmental agencies. The state feared
that these developments would result in irreparable damage to water locations vital to the
habits of anadromous fish. Both applicants had formulated experimental plans for
protection of the fish. The licenses were awarded on the theory that Section 9(b) of the
Federal Power Act required only that compliance with state law which was sufficient to
satisfy the Commission. The conflict between the state and the federal government was
resolved on the basis of the decision in McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876), which
established the supremacy of the federal government's power over navigable waters.

NOTES
Even though an applicant meets all of these criteria, he may be denied a license. If the FPC decides that it is preferable for the project to
be constructed by the federal government, Section 7(b) of the Act requires the Commission to deny the permit and to recommend formally
such action to Congress. -7 On its face, this provision seems to call for
an independent assessment of the public-private power issue whenever the
Commission is confronted with a private application. The absence of
Congressional policy establishing a presumption in favor of a nationalized
or private power industry makes such a decision difficult as well as
significant. s
Proponents of public power urge that it obtains funds at less expense,29 has fewer taxes to pay," provides integrated development," insures national defense, 2 enables subsidization and development of low
Even though the municipalities received licenses, accomplishment of successful operation
could not be safeguarded in any way by the FPC. The states possess a tremendous potential weapon for obstructing development by the debt limits imposed upon most local
units of government. For a list of states having such statutes, see Durisch, Publicly
Owned Utilities and the Problem of Municipal Debt Limits, 31 MIcE. L. REv. 503-511
(1933).
27. "Whenever, in the judgment of the Commission, the development of any water
resources for public purposes should be undertaken by the United States itself, the Commission shall not approve any application for any project affecting such development, but
shall cause to be made such examinations, surveys, reports, plans, and estimates of the
cost of the proposed development as it may find necessary, and shall submit its findings
to Congress with such recommendations as it may find appropriate concerning such development." 41 STAT. 1067 (1920), as amended, 49 STAT. 842 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §800(b)
(1946).
Section 4(e) of the Act precludes the Commission from issuing a license, after a
recommendation under Section 7(b), within a period of two years. 41 STAT. 1068 (1920),
16 U.S.C. §802(b) (1946).
28. The absence of a uniform federal policy governing comprehensive development
of water and land resources is commented upon in 3 REPORT PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMM'N 450 (1950), and ELECTRIC POWER & GOVERNMENT POLICY 711
(Twentieth Century Fund 1948).
20. GUTHMANN AND DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 250 (1948).
This
argument is based on the fact that public power agencies are usually able to obtain a
lower rate of interest since the credit is that of the taxpayers.
30. Ibid. Nevertheless, it is pointed out, this argument may cut both ways since the
tax burden is simply being shifted to all the taxpayers instead of the consumers. Many
contend, on this ground, for the inclusion of a tax "equivalent" in the estimated "costs"
of public projects. See ELECTRIC POWER AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 655 (Twentieth Century Fund 1948) ; Homer, infra note 33. Of course if a deliberate policy of low pricing
is followed in order to subsidize a region, see note 33 infra, this argument applies only
insofar as the costs of administering taxes are saved.
31. Ibid. See also Raver, Government Action and Private Enterprise in River Valley Delvelopment, 41 AM. EcoN. REv. 289, 291 (Supp. 1951).
32. This argument is based on the theory that integrated construction under one
management will provide greater assurance of complete development, thereby establishing
the utmost use of water resources which are vital to defense of the country. ELECTRIC
POWER & GOVERNMENT POLICY 44 (Twentieth Century Fund 1948). Another aspect of
the same argument assumes that the government should use a pure power project to
subsidize the rest of a basin development. See p. 568 infra.
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income regions,3 and offers a means of employment stabilization."4 Private power advocates, on the other hand, criticize public power on the
grounds that it lacks the ability of private enterprise to obtain and hold
skilled administrative personnel, 5 is unable to make rapid innovations in
order to meet changing conditions,3 6 suffers generally from political inefficiency, 7 and does not offer advancement in technological improvement since the profit motive is absent. 8
This bewildering array of
arguments might well daunt a body whose control over the subject was
plenary. The scope of the FPC's decision is severely limited by its lack of
33. It is this type of power project which raises the greatest amount of controversy.
If the government builds a power dam, it may be utilized as a means of subsidizing power
consumers in the general area by providing extremely low rates. See TROXEL, op. cit. supra
note 13, at 441-463. This subsidization process occurs at the expense of federal taxpayers
over the entire country. See Horner, A Desirable National Water Policy, 41 Amt. EcoN.
REv. 280 (Supp. 1951).
34. BARNES, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 818 (1942). TROXL,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 716.
35. GUTHMANN AND DOUGALL, op. cit. supra note 29, at 250.
36. Ibid.
37. TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 662.
38. CLEMENS, EcONOMIcS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 557 (1950).
This summarization of arguments is, by no means, exhaustive, and certainly many of
them may be easily eliminated in particular cases. The broad political arguments, accusations of "socialism" on the one side and crys of "laissez faire" or "reaction" on the
other side, have been purposely avoided.
The production or distribution of electric power falls within the category of a natural
monopoly. This term generally implies that "the control of public utility service in a
market is somehow naturally or inherently monopolistic, that the rivalry between unregulated companies is inevitably eliminated, and one company ultimately dominates the
market which several companies once occupied." TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 27. It
is generally considered that this monopoly situation requires the imposition of certain
duties upon public utility industries. There are "four duties common to public utility industries: (1) the duty to serve all comers, (2) the duty to render adequate service, (3)
the duty to serve at reasonable rates, and (4) the duty to serve without discrimination."
CLEMENS, supra at 13. The fact, then, that these industries require regulation is well
recognized. The quality of regulation has, however, been severely criticized. Public
ownership proponents have contended that regulating commissions have been "ultraconservative if not the actual tools of the utility interests." Id. at 575. In the controversy between public and private power it is logical that the regulators look with sympathy upon the private companies since any other view would "diminish their own
powers and prestige." Ibid..
Competition between private and public ownership is sometimes seen as a means of
motivating better service from private companies at more reasonable rates. Lewis, The
Role of the Federal Power Commission Regarding the Power Features of Federal
Projects, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 96 (1945). For various views of this power controversy, see Smith, Is Public Ownership the Answer to Urban Transit?, 50 P.U. FORT. 424
(1952) ; Etter, A Survey of the Oregon Law on Public Ownership and Operationof Public Utilities, 25 ORE. L. REv. 159 (1946) ; Bauer, Why Public Organization of Electric
Power?, 30 GEO. L.J. 705 (1942) ; Meyer, Why Government Railroads?, 8 I.C.C. PRACTITIONERS' J. 253 (1941) ; Simons, The Requisites of Free Competition, 26 AMi. ECON. Rxv.
68 (Supp. 1936) ; Albertsworth, ConstitutionalIssues of the Federal Power Program, 2S
ILL. L. REv. 833 (1935).

NOTES

authority to initiate federal projects." The issue posed is whether this
limitation is so pervasive as to do away with its responsibility for the
independent judgment which Section 7(b) apparently requires.
In 1949, the Federal Power Commission considered the proposals of
the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a private applicant, and of the
Fresno Irrigation District for development of power sites on the Kings
River in California." The national government had begun construction
on a flood control dam at Pine Flat."' Fresno was interested in constructing a hydroelectric plant at this site and another plant to be located upstream on the North Fork and main channel of the Kings River. 2 The
Pacific Gas and Electric Company also wished to develop the latter site.
The Secretary of Interior was permitted to intervene in these proceedings
and recommended that the applicants be denied. He proposed that all
further development of the water resources of Kings River be reserved
exclusively to the United States under the provisions of a comprehensive
plane developed by the Bureau of Reclamation." Reversing the hearing
examiner, the Commission authorized a license for Pacific Company for
the North Fork project and similarly approved Fresno's application for
the Pine Flat Power Plant.44 On rehearing, this decision was upheld. 5
Since no all inclusive program for this basin had been approved by
Congress, the FPC was not compelled to abide by any particular scheme."'
39. Section 7(b) of the Federal Power Act, see note 27 supra, empowers the Commission to recommend construction to Congress, when, in its judgment, federal construction is desirable. This is the limit, however, of the FPC's authority; it cannot authorize
government construction and, therefore, cannot be certain of such development.
40. Fresno Irrigation District, 8 F.P.C. 348 (1949).
41. Id. at 350.
42. Ibid. The project which was proposed by the Fresno -Irrigation District at the
Pine Flat location was contingent upon federal construction of the Pine Flat dam. The
final decision to build this dam was made' jointly by the Chief of Engineers and the
Commissioner of Reclamation in 1946.
43. Id. at 351. The examiner, after considering the arguments, advised the Commission to recommend that these water resources be undertaken by the federal government under Section 7(b) of the Federal Power Act.
It has been suggested that, behind the scenes, there was another dispute between the
Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Engineers, both fighting for the right to build the
new dam and water storage project proposed by Interior, when and if authorized by
Congress. Conant, What's Holding Up Kings River Development?, 50 P.U. FORT. 272
(1952). It appears that Congress has been more inclined to assign planning activities to
the Corps of Engineers than to other agencies under the executive branch of the government. Maas, Congress and Water Resources, 44 A-.. POL. ScL REv. 576, 587 (1950).
44. Fresno Irrigation District, 8 F.P.C. 348, 359 (1949) (issuance of license to
Fresno) ; Id. at 362 (issuance of license to Pacific Company).
45. Fresno Irrigation District, 10 F.P.C. 460 (1951).
46. This controversy illustrates a situation in which the cooperative arrangements
between federal agencies, see note 10 supra, were noticeable because of their absence.
Ordinarily, the FPC accepts and utilizes programs which have been developed by other
groups. It would appear, however, that the plan, in this particular instance, was completely inadequate. "Serious question as to the economic and engineering feasibility of
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The Bureau of Reclamation did present a plan, however, and argued that
the power site was invaluable to the government as a financial supplement
to other aspects of water development in the basin." The Commission's
rejection of this argument was not a rejection of the policy which it implied but rather a determination that the project would not accomplish the
purposes intended by Interior.4" The Fresno and Pacific Company proposals were held to provide for more complete development of the area's
water resources.4" The decisive factor in the case, however, was the
absence of any definite Congressional intention to initiate a federal
project."0 The Commission was unwilling to delay development of the
site in the face of pressing needs and the prospect of substituting low cost
electrical power for more expensive and nonreplaceable fuels."'
To the extent that this argument is given weight, the basis of the
Commission's decision tends to become the likelihood of government construction rather than its merits. Of course, the limited effect which dethe Bureau's plan was raised in the exceptions filed to the examiner's report. Under date
of August 15, 1949, the President of the United States returned the Secretary's report,
together with a related report of the Chief of Engineers, with the comment that they did
not contain 'sufficient economic information with respect to engineering and economic
feasibility to justify their approval as a comprehensive valley plan.'" Fresno Irrigation
District, 8 F.P.C. 348, 352 (1949). The Commission, therefore, had considerable support
in its rejection of the plan.
47. Id. at 351.
48. The proposals of the Secretary of Interior were submitted to the state of California for analysis, and the Governor's report also found this plan to be inadequate. It
was pointed out that the estimated charge to consumers for power would have to be much
higher than stated in order for the power project to be economically feasible. Fresno
Although this booster argument (the
Irrigation District, 10 F.P.C. 460, 462 (1951).
returns from the power project would assist in financing other aspects of the development) was made by the Secretary of Interior, a Kings River Report which he had
adopted indicated that ". . . the annual power costs would be in excess of the anticipated
power revenues." Ibid.
49. With regard to construction of the large power dam, it was stated that"... the
evidence shows that the only large power developer which has the requisite additional
generating capacity and power loads with suitable characteristics to justify efficient and
economic operation of these proposed North Fork plants is Pacific Gas & Electric Co."
Fresno Irrigation District, 8 F.P.C. 348, 355 (1949). See also Fresno Irrigation District,
10 F.P.C. 460, 462 (1951).
50. Fresno Irrigation District, 8 F.P.C. 348, 356 (1949). It was stated that the
possibility of construction by the United States was too remote to justify reserving the
site in the hope that an eventual federal project might be authorized which would yield
greater public benefits not now ascertainable. In the meantime, it was asserted, this
valuable water resource would be wasted.
51. The second opinion, however, did modify the license to the Pacific Company to
thirty years instead of the customary period of fifty years. Fresno Irrigation District,
10 F.P.C. 460, 465 (1951). This indicates a reluctance, on the part of the Commission, to
make quite so far reaching a decision. The government will be given an opportunity to
evaluate the situation at the end of the license and determine the feasibility of public
managment at that time. Section 14 of the Federal Power Act provides that the government may acquire any project at the expiration of a license and expressly reserves the
right of the government to procure a development at any time by condemnation proceedings. 41 STAT. 1071 (1920), as amended, 49 STAT. 844 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §807 (1946).

NOTES
nial of a permit can have makes the relative probability of a future federal
project a persuasive consideration.12 In this instance, however, the Commission went far beyond merely taking into account the urgency of the
area's needs and the possibility of Congressional action. Instead of making an independent judgment on the merits of federal construction, the
FPC appeared to act as a court upon whom adversaries press arguments.
The Secretary of Interior's proposal was evaluated like that of an ordinary applicant. So far as the opinions in the case are concerned, specific
consideration of Section 7(b) was limited to the statement that: "If a
demonstrable advantage would result from Federal development, a
recommendation to Congress to that effect under Section 7(b) of the
Act would be justified, but no such demonstration has been given here.""3
The one argument advanced in favor of federal power, i.e., the contention
that the proceeds from the sale of power could be used to assist in financing other portions of the basin development, was never really faced. 4
The Roanoke Rapids case of 1951 presents a similar but more complex
picture. The Flood Control Act of 1944 expressly approved a plan
drafted by the Corps of Engineers for development of the Roanoke
River basin." Several flood control projects were authorized for immediate federal construction.5" A private enterprise, Virginia Electric
and Power Company, applied for permission to construct a hydroelectric
generating station at Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina." Once again the
Interior Department, this time joined by the Virginia Rural Electrifica52. See note 39 supra.
53. Fresno Irrigation District, 8 F.P.C. 348, 356 (1949).
54. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. This is not to say that Interior's
argument was necessarily correct. Power developments on projects constructed for irrigational or navigational purposes apparently only make use of facilities which the
government is already committed to construct for other reasons. While the propriety of
subsidizing other aspects of water development at the expense of the power consumer
may be questioned, there seems to be no alternative to federal development of such power
possibilities except allowing them to go unused. (Compare, however, the award of a
license to Fresno for a power project at a flood control dam.) Deliberately to base
federal control on such subsidization would appear to require stronger justification.
Further, operating a government power project as a profit-making enterprise tends to
run contrary to the policy of reducing prices in order to expand the use of electricity.
See note 18 supra and ELEcTRIc POWER AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 658 et seq. especially
at 673 (Twentieth Century Fund 1948).
55. 58 STAT. 887 (1944), 33 U.S.C. §701-1 (1946).
56. The District Engineer pointed out that the federal government's projects at
Buggs Island and Philpott would "eliminate over 90 per cent of the flood losses to the
two main flood-damage areas in the Roanoke River Basin." United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 160 (1953).
57. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 10 F.P.C. 1, 19 (1951). In the findings, it is
stated that the Roanoke Rapids project would have no beneficial or adverse effect upon
the flood control plans for the basin. Id. at 9.
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tion Association, intervened and objected to the issuance of a license. 8
Congressional approval of a comprehensive program was interpreted by
the Secretary of Interior to mean that the entire development was reserved for federal construction. 9 The Commission, on the other hand,
simply construed this Act to require that applicants conform with the
requisites specified by the statute.6" The case was carried to the Supreme
Court of the United States where the Federal Power Commission's decision was sustained.6
The meaning of the Flood Control Act was the dominant issue in
the judicial proceedings. Relatively little attention was given to the
question of whether or not the Commission should have authorized federal
construction under Section 7 (b).62 As in the Kings River case, the moving consideration in the FPC's 7(b) finding was that "the Federal Act
looks to prompt development of water resources where such development
is feasible and in the public interest, and it gives to the Commission discretionary power to delay utilization only where such delay is found to be
imperative."6 In the eyes of the hearing examiner, whose decision was
expressly approved by the Commission, the unlikelihood of Congressional
action negated any advantages of federal construction.64
The Interior Department repeated its Kings River contention that
the financial returns from a federal power project could be used to finance
58. This provision, 58 STAT. 890 (1944), 16 U.S.C. §825s (1946), makes the Interior
Department the marketing agent of all public power produced in conjunction with federal
projects constructed under this Act. A preference in favor of municipalities is provided
for the distribution of this power. This is one basis for Interior's intervention in the case
and also explains the interest of the Virginia REA, whichwould come within this
preference.
59. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 163 (1953). The words
"approved," "authorized," and "adopted," as used in the Flood Control Act, were the subject of a great deal of discussion in the case. The Roanoke Rapids site was certainly
approved; however, construction by the United States was not authorized.
60. The Federal Power Commission was largely supported in this position by the
treatment of similar sites on the Savannah River in Georgia, which also were within an
approved comprehensive plan. This approval was not considered as meaning that all of
the sites were necessarily reserved for federal construction. Congressional hearings,
Hearings before House Committee on Public Works on H.R. 5472 (Title II), 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 37-85 (1949), were held to determine the desirability of United States construction. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 165 (1953).
61. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC 191 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 345
U.S. 153 (1953).
62. See note 27 supra.
63. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 10 F.P.C. 1, 4 (1951). It is also indicated that
Congress had knowledge of the application pending before the FPC for a private license
to develop the Roanoke hydroelectric project; nevertheless, no efforts had been made to
obtain Congressional authorization for a federal project. Ibid. The fact that Congress
had not acted during this period might be construed, in the manner of a negative implication, to mean that Congress had no objections to the issuance of a private license.
64. Ibid. See also United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 191 F.2d 796, 809 (4th
Cir. 1951).
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other aspects of the region's water development.65 In dissent, Justice
Douglas characterized the licensing of a private company as a gift of the
most valuable financial source in the region.6" The FPC opinion does not
cover this point, but the Court of Appeals felt that the Commission's
action was justified since the national government would charge VEPCO
for any benefits received from its position downstream from other federal
projects and because the potential of the site would be lost in the absence
of Congressional action.67 The Supreme Court contented itself with the
remark that ".

. . it has never been suggested that such [Interior's

argument] is the criterion under which the Commission is to determine
whether a project ought to be undertaken by the United States.
On the whole, the FPC's treatment of the public power arguments
was similar to that of the Kings River opinion; only those objections
directly presented by Interior were considered. The issue raised by this
approach is whether public power proponents, after having been defeated
in the license proceeding, should have a right to judicial review.
The Federal Power Act makes standing to appeal decisions of the
FPC turn upon whether or not one is a "party aggrieved." 9 The Flood
Control Act of 1944 established Interior as the marketing agent of surplus
power arising out of federal projects within the Roanoke region."0 Since
Interior is required to show preference toward local public power distributors, the position of the Virginia R.E.A. is also based on this surplus
power issue. The Commission and the Court of Appeals maintained that
neither party had any legal interest in this matter until and unless a federal
65. Id. at 808. The Commission specifically found that VEPCO's project was
economically feasible, i.e., could produce a fair return. Interior Department, however,
maintained that the private applicant would not come within the economic feasibility requirement after payments for headwater benefits were included. Transcript of Record,
p. 20, United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153 (1953).
66. "The master plan now becomes clear: the Federal Government will put up the
auxiliary units-the unprofitable ones; and the private power interests will take the
plums-the choice ones." United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 151, 181
(1953). Justice Douglas was joined, in dissent, by Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Black.
67. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 191 F.2d 796, 809 (4th Cir. 1951). Section 10(f) of the Federal Power Act requires that private licensees compensate the
United States for benefits derived through the construction of federal projects on the
waterway. 41 STAT. 1068 (1920), as amended, 49 STAT. 842 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §803(f)

(1946).
68. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 171 (1953).
69. Section 313(a) of the Federal Power Act states that: "[A]ny person, State,
municipality, or State commission aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in a
proceeding under this act to which such person, State, municipality, or State commission
is a party may apply for a rehearing within thirty days after the issuance of such order."
49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §825 1 (a) (1946).

70. See note 60 supra.
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project was constructed. 7 The Supreme Court overruled the lower court
on this point and concluded that the petitioners did have standing although it failed to explain this holding.72
If these parties are not found to be properly in court, the question of
the protection of the interests of the government may be raised. It would
be difficult to locate a party who could litigate the decision of the Commission." On the other hand, the Court of Appeals resolved that Congress had vested the FPC with final authority over the question. 74 It
cannot be controverted that encouragement of this type of intergovernmental conflict hampers the effective performance of an agency. The
Interior Department succeeded in delaying the private company in the
Kings River controversy for more than five years and impeded the
Roanoke project for many years.75 If the FPC were taking the initiative
and attempting to develop some policy under Section 7(b), the argument
of the Fourth Circuit would carry more weight. Because the Commission prefers to employ adversary proceedings, perhaps it is reasonable to
permit proponents of public power to appeal and thereby compel the
agency to perform its functions more responsibly.
In one recent case, the FPC did make a recommendation under Section 7 (b), but those who look for statements of policy concerning federal
power development will be ill satisfied. The New York Power Authority,
an agericy of the State of New York, applied for a license to construct a
71. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 10 F.P.C. 1, 5 (1951); United States ex rel.
Chapman v. FPC, 191 F.2d 796, 799 (4th Cir. 1951). In the court of appeals the question
of the right of the United States, representing the people, to appeal an FPC decision on
the grounds of this interest is discussed. The court admits the existence of such an interest but denies the Interior Department is the proper party to go into court to protect
it. Id. at 800.
72. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). The opinion
states that the tremendous divergence of views on the question of petitioner's right to
appeal precluded unanimous agreement on this point.
73. One view of the right to appeal an FPC opinion is embodied in the statement
that:

".

.

. [T]hose persons who may be the only ones sufficiently concerned to contest

agency action should be given a liberal opportunity to do so, since this serves the public
as a useful check upon agency discretion." 65 H1Rv. L. REv. 892, 893 (1952). Preference
for a strict construction of the "person aggrieved" requirement may be found in 22
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 105 (1953). The Interior Department has an undeniable interest in
the development of irrigation projects. As the Secretary of Interior's argument to the
Commission was that the potential revenues from a federal project were desirable for
the support of other aspects of river basin development, his interest in the decision seems,
as a practical matter, quite clear.
74. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 191 F.2d 796, 800 (4th Cir. 1951).
75. Even though a license was authorized by the Commission for the Pacific Gas
and Electric Company in 1949, it still had not been issued in 1952. Conant, What's Holding Up Kings River Development?, 50 P.U. FoRT. 272, 280 (1952). Interior appealed the
decision in the second opinion to the Court of Appeals for the ninth circuit but dropped
it in 1953. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 1953, p. 3, col. 2.

NOTES
hydroelectric plant in the International Rapids of the St. Lawrence River."6
This project is merely one phase of the controversial St. Lawrence seaway
development, discussed in Canada and the United States for over thirty
years and recently approved by Congress.77
The Commission denied the original application of the New York
Power Authority in 1950;78 and construction by the United States was
recommended under Section 7(b) of the Federal Powei Act." The
opinion asserted that ".

.

. the critical international situation now facing

the world calls for immediate commencement of construction of the combined [St. Lawrence] project

....

Nevertheless, the vitally important

seaway would still await action by Congress if the power development
here proposed should actually be constructed, and it appears to us, on the
basis of the national aspects of the power development, combined with
the national and international benefits to be obtained from the seaway,
that it is highly desirable, for Congress to pass upon the proposal in its
entirety rather than on a piecemeal basis." 8 The Commission felt that
the entire St. Lawrence development should be an integrated and federally
constructed program. A recommendation of this type withdraws the
FPC's licensing power as respects the specific site for a period of two
years and provides Congress with an opportunity to consider thoroughly
the recommendation."
After this period the Commission may grant a
license in the absence of intervening legislation.
The New York Power Authority appealed the decision of the FPC
to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Since at
76. Power Authority of the State of New York, 9 F.P.C. 301 (1950).
77. For a background and discussion of the St. Lawrence Seaway and the controversies over construction of various portions of the project, see Woodbury, Niagara
Should Be a Business Company Project, 51 P.U. FoRT. 687 (1953). The actual construction of the seaway has recently been passed in Congress; see 100 Cong. Rec. 541-542
(1954) and the Louisville Courier Journal, May 7, 1954, §2, p. 23, col. 8.
Also in this area is the proposed Niagara Falls project. Because of an agreement
with Canada concerning diversions from the Niagara River, increasing the electric
capacity at Niagara Falls, no further power development may be licensed at this site
without express authorization from Congress. Woomupy, op. cit. supra note 77, at 688.
Proposed construction of this project by the New York Power authority, the federal
government and private enterprise has been debated. It is manifest, then, that the
Federal Power Commission has authority, at the present time, only in the International
Rapids section.
78. Power Authority of the State of New York, 9 F.P.C. 301, 305 (1950).
79. See note 27 supra for the meaning of a Section 7(b) recommendation by the
Commission to Congress. It should be observed that this recommendation distinguishes
the present case from the Kings River and Roanoke River controversies. Nevertheless,
in all of these cases, even though Section 7(b) was exercised only in the New York Power
Authority opinion, Congress had an ample period in which to preclude a license to any of
the applicants had it wished to take this function upon itself.
80. Power Authority of the State of New York, 9 F.P.C. 301, 303, 305 (1950).
81. See note 27 supra.
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the end of two years Congress had not acted, the agency joined with the
Power Authority in asking for a dismissal, and the Authority's application for a license was reconsidered. - By this time a private applicant, the
Public Power and Water Corporation, had also applied for a permit to
develop the site.83 A license was granted to the Power Authority, and the
Commission's decision was upheld on appeal."4
As Commissioner Smith pointed out in his dissent to the first opinion
in this case, there was at that point no question of a conflict between
advocates of private and public power.85 That issue arose later in the
context of competing private and state applications. Even then the Commission was not compelled to make a policy decision of any broad significance. The plan of the private company was completely inadequate from
an economic and engineering viewpoint,8" and, in addition, Canada expressed an unwillingness to cooperate with this applicant.8 7 Nevertheless,
this case does have importance in the development of the Commission's
treatment of Section 7 (b).
The precise ground on which the FPC made the recommendation to
Congress, in the first opinion, is difficult to ascertain. None of the arguments advanced by the Department of Interior in the previous cases appeared to play a very important role, and the urgency of the need for
power in the area was seemingly as great as that in the Kings River and
Roanoke River basins. It might be possible to interpret the Commission's
opinion as a holding that only a federal project could be adequately integrated into a comprehensive plan for the St. Lawrence seaway develop82. Power Authority of the State of New York v. FPC, CCH UTILITIES LAW REP.
ff 9289 (FPC 1952) ; Power Authority of the State of New York, F.P.C. Opinion No.
255 (July 15, 1953).
83. The application of the Public Power and Water Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the private company, was denied in Public Power and Water Corp., F.P.C.
Opinion No. 256 (July 15, 1953).
84. Power Authority of the State of New York, F.P.C. Opinion No. 255 (July 15,
1953); Lake Ontario Land Development and Beach Protection Ass'n v. FPC, 212
F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
85. Power Authority of the State of New York, 9 F.P.C. 301, 307 (1950).
86. The estimated cost of the applicant's proposal was over $300 million. Only $260
in cash had been paid in on the company's outstanding stock, and it owned no property.
No attempt was made by the company to explain its financial plans. The Commission
viewed the financial ability of the applicant as a little doubtful. See Public Power and
Water Corp., F.P.C. Opinion No. 256 (July 15, 1953).
87 It was pointed out that the cooperation of Canada is extremely vital to successful completion of the project. Although the private company had attempted to gain the
assent of Canada, it had failed.
The New York Power Authority, on the other hand, was acceptable to Canada.
Under a treaty with Canada it was necessary for the President to designate formally the
Power Authority as the representative of the United States in this venture. Exec. Order
No. 10500, 18 FED. REG. 7005 (1953). This discussion does not attempt to deal with the
international questions involved'in the case.
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ment. Commissioner Smith's dissent, however, notes that the Power
Authority's project met all of the specifications of the Army Engineers'
plan, which was accepted in toto by the majority " Perhaps the best explanation is that, since the majority felt that federal action was imminent,
they preferred to leave the decision to Congress. When it became apparent that Congressional intervention might be delayed for a considerable
period, they were perfectly willing to reverse themselves.8 9
Clearly, the Commission views Section 7(b) as a sort of co-ordinating device through which sites are kept open when Congressional action
is expected. Undoubtedly, the dominant factor in all of these cases is
the presence or absence of manifest intent by Congress to authorize
government construction within a reasonable period of time.9" At this
point the urgency of demands for power is allowed to complete the decision for or against an application. This emphasis on immediate need is
perhaps justified by the fact that these sites are not irretrievably lost to
88. "It should be emphasized that the works which the State of New York proposes
to construct for power development are essentially the same as those proposed by the
Corps of Engineers in its plan for the Seaway Project. Their prior construction would
in no way interfere with, add to the cost, or impair the feasibility of any additional improvements which the United States might at any time decide to make for navigation
purposes." Power Authority of the State of New York, 9 F.P.C. 301, 308 (1950).
89. One very important aspect of the International Rapids case, as well as the other
cases, is the question of preference of municipal distribution. This type of preference
must be distinguished from the preference at the construction level. Section 7(a) of the
Federal Power Act requires that the Commission show a preference to state or municipal
applicants if their plans are at least as adequate for comprehensive development. 41
It will
STAT. 1067 (1920), as amended, 49 STAT. 842 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §800(a) (1946)
be noted that if the plan of the Water Corporation, in the New York case, had been as
acceptable as the New York Power Authority plan, the FPC would have been compelled
to show preference toward the state agency. This type of decision was not, however,
necessary in the case.
The distribution preference, which is the pertinent interest at this point, concerns the
management of power sales after a dam has been constructed. Congress usually prescribes, in projects built by the federal government, a municipality preference for distribution, as is illustrated in the Flood Control Act, see note 58 supra. The Power Commission, however, is not specifically authorized to impose a condition of preference, at
this level, on its licensees and in the International Rapids case refused to do so. Power
Authority of the State of New York, F.P.C. Opinion No. 255 (July 15, 1953). This fact
further explains the position of the Virginia REA in the Roanoke Rap2ds controversy,
perhaps demonstrating even greater justification for the REA's right to appeal the Commission's decision. The importance of a preference at this level hinges largely on the
ability of local public power distributors to compete with privately owned utilities. This
type of competition, and even the threat of it, has been considered as a control over
utility prices. ELECTRIC POWER AND GOvERNMENT POLiCY 493, n. 4 9 (Twentieth Century
Fund 1948), CLEmENS, op. cit. supra note 38, at 522-547 For a discussion of the role
of the REA in stimulating the same type of competition, see id. at 580-602. Some of
the advantages and disadvantages of municipal ownership are outlined in HALL, GOVERNMENT AND BusiNEss 258-265 (1st ed. 1934).
90. There are no cases, other than those reviewed here, which involve the hydroelectric power problem in multi-purpose projects. While the cases are not sufficient in
number to provide a completely satisfactory picture, they do establish a definite trend in
the approach of the FPC.
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the United States. At the expiration of any license, the government may
acquire the project by paying compensation, and condemnation proceedings enable the government to procure a development at any time."
Obviously, then, the Commission's decisions on the issue of public or
private management are reversible. Moreover, the private projects constructed in the cases reviewed are not materially different from those
which the federal government would have undertaken had public power
advocates prevailed. While the approach of the FPC does not reveal a
satisfactory analysis of the policy questions involved, the result would
appear to justify the Commission's refusal, under these circumstances, to
delay private construction unless there is assurance that the federal
project will soon be undertaken.92
The effects of decision in favor of private power, however, cannot
always be reversed. In planning for construction, the government is not
bound, as is private enterprise, by the requirement of economic feasibility
If it is thought that a particular region should be subsidized, projects the
size of which would forbid private development may be undertaken."' The
most recent power debates concerning the production of power on the
Snake River in the Pacific Northwest squarely present this problem.
Supporters of federal power, who included, until recently, the Interior
Department, have favored construction of a large Hell's Canyon dam. 9'
The Idaho Power Company has applied for a private license to build
three smaller dams at points downstream, but the pressure on the Commission in this controversy has somewhat lessened as a result of Interior's
withdrawal."5 Still, a determination in this case based solely on the like91. See note 51 supra.
92. Justice Douglas contended that the Roanoke Rapids site should be reserved for
the federal government as one of a "shelf" of projects in an employment stabilization
program. He argued not on the basis of Section 7(b) but rather that this was what
Congress intended in adopting the Flood Control Act of 1944. See United States ex rel.
Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 180 (1953). Such use of power projects is not widely
approved. See note 34 supra and FRiEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 117-155
(1953). So far as the FPC is concerned, there is no indication that the loss of any
particular site would so cripple Congressional attempts to adopt this kind of antibusiness
cycle policy as to justify a 7(b) denial of a license to a private company.
93. See note 33 supra for comments concerning the subsidization argument.
94. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1953, p. 12, col. 2.
95. McKay, Why Interior Dropped Hell's Canyon Project, 51 P.U. FORT. 734-739
(1953). Douglas McKay, present Secretary of Interior, stated that it would be at least
seven or eight years before the United States could possibly be ready to begin construction, and he also asserts that it would take twenty-five years to catch up with the benefits
of present construction. The Secretary maintains that he has no intention of selling out
federal projects, power is badly needed now, and he feels that immediate action is
desirable.
This note does not attempt to assay the problems of federalism and decentralization
of political and economic power inherent in the ca&es reviewed. A recent magazine article,
commenting on the public power-private power controversy in the Hell's Canyon hearing,
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lihood of Congressional action might not be as easily explained as in the
Kings River and Roanoke cases. The decision in favor of one or three
dams probably cannot be reversed, for although the federal government
could eventually acquire the project, the dams could not feasibly be altered.
Continuation of the Commission's present approach to Section 7(b) could
conceivably do irreparable harm."
The position of the Federal Power Commission in the power controversy is not enviable. In the absence of a national policy, the Commission
is understandably reluctant to decide these cases on the broadest grounds,
particularly when that determination is contrary to consumers' wishes. If
construction by the federal government appears preferable, it can only
make a recommendation, for the Commission lacks power to initiate such
development. 7 Nevertheless, Section 7(b) unequivocally requires the
FPC to indulge in a policy judgment for which no guidance is provided ;98
little assistance has been subsequently offered by Congress, which has
preferred silence in the controversy. The inevitable result is a complete
absence of significant trends established by any governmental body. It
has been suggested that regional power authorities having the final decision as to public or private projects within their areas should be created.99
Since no greater assistance is provided them, however, it is difficult to
discern any improvement in this proposal.
makes the observation that the Idaho Power Company, representing the "state" or "local"
side in this fight, is a corporation whose thirty largest stockholders are Eastern and
Midwestern insurance companies and investment houses. The federal side of the battle
is represented mostly of local enterprises. The Reporter, March 30, 1954, p. 5, col. 1.
96. There is no particular reason to suppose that similar "subsidization" arguments
could not have been raised in the other cases reviewed, though of course this does not
mean that they would have been compelling - if thoroughly investigated. The hiatus between the FPC's function as described in Section 7(b) and as actually performed becomes somewhat startling if viewed in this light.
97. See note 40 supra.
98. The legislative history of Section 7(b) reveals nothing which would aid the
Commission. See generally SEN. Doc. No. 269, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920), and H.R.
REP. No. 910, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920).
99. "To insure the preparation of sound basin programs, Congress should direct
the responsible Federal agencies to cooperate with each other and with the appropriate
State agencies in the necessary surveys and plans. Such action requires some definite
coordination of the efforts of Federal and State agencies. . . . [T]he Commission believes that, lacking such agency reorganization as was recommended by the Commission
on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission),
Congress should set up a separate river basin commission for each of the major basins."
1 REPORT PREsImENT's WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMM'N 10 (1950).
This report
suggests that the approval of the basin commission should be a prerequisite to the
issuance of a license by the FPC. Id. at 245. For an insight into the nature of such a
reorganization and a discussion of the government's use of the corporate device in this
manner, see Dykstra, Federal Government, State Governments and Natural Resources, 37
MINN. L. REv. 569 (1953); Jordan, Do We Need More Federal Power Authorities?, 50
P U. FORT. 817 (1952) ; Comments, Governmental Techniques for the Conservation and
Utilization of Water Resources: An Analysis and Proposal,56 YALE L.J. 276 (1947) ;
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Congress should begin formulating policies on this problem. The
tremendous burden of attempting to analyze all the facets of this issue in
every case would seem to require reliance by the Commission on some
sort of general standard, whether Congressionally prescribed or internally
developed. Perhaps, on the other hand, the time has not yet arrived when
it would be feasible for Congress to establish a definite policy. In either
event, the Federal Power Commission should be making more penetrating
decisions. The co-ordinating function prescribed by 7(b), necessary in
any economy allowing both private and public power development, simply
makes no sense in the absence of some sort of general policy. It is not
possible for the Commission to specify a national policy, but it should
commence to develop a nucleus of standards. The ultimate decision would
remain with Congress, where it belongs; when the judgment of Congress
and the Commission do not coincide, the New York Power Authority case
demonstrates the FPC's ability to reverse itself after the two year waiting
period."' This approach would stimulate Congressional establishment
of a federal water policy.

HIGHWAY TAXATION AND REGULATION: THE CASE FOR
FEDERAL ENTRY
Gaining momentum from every cry of "Foul!" emanating from
truckers is the idea that federal intervention alone can prevent state
legislatures from erecting figurative regulatory and tax barricades in
the path of interstate commerce.1 However, Congressional leaps into the
Edelmann, The T.'.A. and Inter-Governmental Relations, 37 AMi. POL. ScI. REv. 455
(1943) ; Hardman, Competition in Public Service-a New Interpretation,48 W. VA. L.Q.
271 (1942) ; Edelmann, Public Ownership and Tax Replacement by the T.V.A., 35 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 727 (1941) ; and Trimble, Constitutionality of Government Competition
with Butsiness, 13 TEMP. L.Q. 201 (1939).

The general advantages of the government's use of the corporate device, as opposed
to administrative agencies, are outlined and discussed in Dimock, Government Corporations; A Focus of Policy and Administration, 43 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 899, 1145 (1949);
Lilienthal and Marquis, The Conduct of Business Enterprises by the Federal Govenmtent,
54 HARV. L. REv. 545 (1941) ; Watkins, Federal Omership of Corporations,26 GEo. L.J.
261 (1938); McIntire, Government Corporations as Administrative Agencies: An Approach, 4 GEo. WASH. L. R v. 161 (1936) ; and Government-Controlled Business Corporations: A Symposium, 10 TULANE L. REv. 79 (1935).
100. Even if Congressional standards are developed, the possibility will continue to
exist that Congress and the FPC (or any agency performing a similar function) may
disagree over the desirability of a particular project.
1. Interstate truckers have voiced objections to virtually every phase of state highway control which has affected them; especial vehemence has been directed toward the
aspects of weight regulation and tax discrimination. See generally PURCELL, INTERSTATE
BARRIERS TO TRUCK TRANSPORTATION (U.S. Dept. Agric. 1950); HILLMAN AND RoWELL,
BARRIERS TO THE INTERSTATE MOVEMENT OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS BY MOTOR VEHICLE
IN THE ELEVEN WESTERN STATES

(U. of Ariz. Agricultural Experiment Station 1953).

